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Comprehensive and reliable situation recording and monitoring are basic prerequi-
sites to avoid collisions and groundings in the maritime traffic system. Due to the tech-
nical advance in the last century both tasks are more and more overtaken by a variety 
of sensors, services and systems. As a result, a steadily increasing number of data is 
provided to describe the current situation on board the ships and in traffic areas. This 
opened the door for the application of integrated data processing techniques to per-
form the analysis of situation up to identification of threats at the soonest. But with 
the enlarging system complexity the necessity arises to evaluate the current usability 
of components and data in use to avoid misinterpretations of the situation. Usability 
evaluation becomes feasible in real time, if suitable integrity monitoring functions can 
be applied. In consequence, the implementation of system and data integrity into the 
maritime traffic system is considered as high-level user need of e-Navigation, a frame-
work initiated by the IMO to enhance the maritime traffic system. The article gives an 
overview about DLR’s 
project »Maritime Traf-
fic Engineering« (2010-
2014), which is pursued 
on the feasibility of in-
tegrity monitoring in 
the maritime position, 
navigation, and timing 
system (PNT) as well as 
during traffic situation 
assessment (TSA).
up to the identification of collision threats. Due to 
the fact that the availability of AIS data depends 
on achieved resilience of AIS based data transfer 
as well as the willingness of involved traffic par-
ticipants for cooperation RADAR (RAdio Detection 
And Ranging) is recognised as the primary aid for 
onboard traffic situation assessment. However, 
the combined use of RADAR and AIS data creates 
the opportunity for an improved description and 
analysis of traffic situation. In order to achieve a safe 
and efficient traffic management the traffic situa-
tion should be associated with the usable traffic 
area. For this purpose all PNT and TSA relevant data 
as well as nautical charts should be handled in one 
and the same reference system. 
The development of the e-Navigation imple-
mentation plan started in the year 2006 with the 
collection of user needs and the identification 
of regulative, administrative and technical gaps 
in the current maritime traffic system. At present 
Introduction 
Comprehensive and reliable situational aware-
ness is a basic prerequisite to avoid collisions and 
groundings as well as to protect life, goods, and 
the maritime habitat. For this purpose the reliable 
knowledge of ship’s position and movement is nec-
essary, taking into account the current traffic situa-
tion and the usable traffic area. In this context PNT 
data characterises the sum of information needed 
to describe ships’ position, movement and attitude 
in time and space. Typical PNT data are amongst 
others latitude, longitude, time, speed over ground 
(SOG), course over ground (COG), heading and rate 
of turn (ROT). The Automatic Identification System 
(AIS) as communication platform supports the ex-
change of static, dynamic, and voyage-related data 
between ships operating in the same sea area. Dy-
namic AIS data are extracted from ship’s PNT data, 
whereby the combined use of own and received 
AIS data enables the assessment of traffic situation 
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Fig. 1: Generic view on 
onboard PNT system with 
basic and additional integrity 
monitoring functionalities
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five  e-Navigation solutions are given top priority 
for realisation, whereby the »improved reliability, 
resilience and integrity of bridge equipment and 
navigation information« is one of them. Due to its 
importance for collision avoidance special atten-
tion is laid on the improvement of onboard PNT 
system by acting as risk control option.
Challenges: reliability, integrity,  
and resilience
Reliability, integrity, and resilience are descriptive 
characteristics stressed in the frame of e-Naviga-
tion to formulate user needs, gaps as well as objec-
tives for the further enhancement of the maritime 
traffic system. Without technical detailing and 
harmonised meaning of the descriptive charac-
teristics it will be impossible to determine the real 
need on research and development regarding the 
maritime PNT and TSA system. 
 Reliability is the ability of a system to perform its 
required functions under specified conditions for a 
certain period of time. Therefore reliability can be 
applied either on the basic functionalities or ad-
ditionally on functionalities monitoring the system 
and data integrity (Fig. 1). An increased level of dif-
ficulties represented by the specified conditions as 
well as higher requirements on quantity and qual-
ity of data products determine in the end which 
sensors, services and methods should be applied 
in minimum.
The maritime community associates integrity 
with the ability of systems to provide the user with 
information about the current usability of the sys-
tem or delivered data products. The meaning of 
integrity information depends strongly on applied 
integrity indicators and used methods for their de-
termination. Plausibility tests allow the detection of 
large errors. Consistency tests applied on data com-
ing from similarly or complementary data sources 
enable the detection of malfunctions and failures 
in parts of the system. However, in case of nauti-
cal information systems the completeness, validity, 
and accuracy of provided data products should be 
the preferred measures to determine their usability. 
For this purpose intrasystem redundancy is neces-
sary to enable the detection of single error sources 
and to estimate the resulting accuracy losses. 
Resilience is a requirement especially claimed for 
safety-critical systems. A resilient system is able to 
detect and compensate external and internal sourc-
es of disturbances, malfunctions and breakdowns 
in parts of the system. For this purpose the sys-
tem needs internal integrity monitoring functions 
whose results are used to manage and steer the sys-
tem operation. The compensation of error sources 
shall be achieved without loss of system function-
alities and preferably without degradation of their 
performance. In order to achieve resilience the need 
on intrasystem redundancy increases to enable 
besides integrity monitoring the compensation of 
detected errors. Both, the requirements on integrity 
as well as resilience in safety-critical systems, have 
implications on the architecture design and the in-
terface specification. On the one hand the chosen 
system architecture reflects a certain level of redun-
dancy determining the feasibility of integrity moni-
toring and the achievable significance of provided 
integrity information. On the other hand additional 
components and functions should be foreseen in 
the architecture to perform integrity monitoring up 
to system steering. Finally, the exchange of integrity 
and steering data should be supported by internal 
and external data interfaces. 
Resilient onboard provision 
of PNT data
Fig. 2 gives an overview of the maritime PNT sys-
tem as it is discussed in time at the level of IALA 
and IMO. Recognised core elements for the world-
wide determination of position, velocity, and time 
data (PVT) are Global Navigation Satellite Systems 
(GNSS), whereby the additional use of Satellite 
Based Augmentation Services (SBAS) and terrestrial 
GNSS augmentation services (e.g. DGNSS) increas-
es accuracy and integrity of GNSS based position-
ing. Due to GNSS’s vulnerability the need on ter-
Fig. 2: Overview of maritime 
PNT system: used and usable 
components and services
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The PNT Unit is an enhanced concept of the 
shipboard processing layer developed by the MTE 
project in cooperation with industrial and admin-
istrative partners (Ziebold et al. 2010).  The concept 
opens the door for the multi-dimensional harmo-
nisation of resilient PNT data provision covering 
carriage requirements, required accuracy and in-
tegrity levels, coordinated exploitation of intrasys-
tem redundancy, need on PNT relevant services, 
consolidation of PNT relevant data formats and 
contents, as well as the enhancement of PNT rel-
evant alarm management under consideration of 
actual requirements originating from service area 
and high-priority navigation tasks. The developed 
initial PNT Unit demonstrates the feasibility that 
such an enhanced data processing layer is able 
to detect and compensate external and internal 
sources of disturbances, malfunctions and break-
downs in parts of the PNT system. 
 As shown in Fig. 4 improved position results are 
only achieved, if applied integrity monitoring tech-
niques (RAIM, innovation filtering) enable the error 
detection and uncorrelated data sources (GPS and 
IMU) ensure their compensation. Continuing devel-
opments are in preparation to clarify the need, role 
and benefits of PNT relevant services (e.g. future 
role of PNT relevant Maritime Safety Information, 
MSI) taking into account the diversity of accuracy 
and integrity requirements and inhomogeneity 
coming from scalable carriage requirements. For 
this purpose the PNT Unit will be upgraded with 
further processing chains utilising the advance in 
services, sensors and data processing techniques. 
Comprehensive and reliable 
traffic situation monitoring
RADAR is recognised as the primary aid for on-
board traffic situation assessment because it 
enables the autonomous localisation of targets 
based on two-way propagation measurements 
of own radio signals. Against this, the reliability 
of AIS based target identification is influenced by 
the willingness of traffic participants for coopera-
restrial radio navigation systems such as eLORAN 
(see the article on page 26) or R-Mode (Ranging 
Mode) is questioned to enable a GNSS independ-
ent determination of PVT data in the future. In the 
classic approach of an onboard PNT module each 
sensor is responsible for the provision of specific 
PNT data: the sensors of World Wide Radio Naviga-
tion Systems (WWRNS) for PVT data and the other 
shipboard sensors for navigation data such as SOG, 
COG, speed through water (STW), heading, or ROT.
The shipboard processing layer is part of the 
applied sensors and represents the intra-sensor 
used methods for the provision of respective PNT 
data. Only in cases of intra-sensor redundant di-
mensioning (e.g. more than five GNSS signals) 
integrity monitoring methods such as RAIM (Re-
ceiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring) can be 
applied. Fig. 3 (left graphic) shows the achievable 
improvement of Single Point Positioning (SPP) with 
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) 
by using a standard GPS receiver operating with 
L1 signals. In general, the horizontal position errors 
are below 10 m. Nominal operation conditions are 
achieved in 99.8% indicating the usability of pro-
vided PNT data. 
Ships using an Integrated Navigation System 
(INS) as shown in Fig. 2 have the opportunity to 
exploit the multi-sensor based redundancy to de-
tect failure and malfunctions in the applied PNT 
sensors, to assess the usability of provided PNT 
data, and to improve the alert management. A 
check matrix performs plausibility and consistency 
tests on the basis of a sensor-overarching meas-
urement model. Due to the fact that plausibility 
tests can only detect large errors and consistency 
tests can only determine relative errors, the cur-
rent INS approach lacks of insufficient navigational 
integrity monitoring and error compensation. A 
loosely coupling of RAIM assessed PVT data com-
ing from the GPS L1 sensor with movement data 
provided by an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) is 
a proceeded INS approach to decrease all horizon-
tal position errors below 5 m (Fig. 3, right graphic).
Fig. 3: Horizontal position 
errors and protection levels 
gathered during a 12 h trial run 
in October 2013: left graphic 
from GPS L1 (SPP with RAIM) 
and right graphic from loosely 
coupled GPS L1 (SPP with 
RAIM) and IMU
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An improved description and monitoring of traf-
fic situation can only be achieved by fusion of traffic 
relevant data coming from different sources such as 
RADAR and AIS. For this purpose it is evident that 
each data source supports an automatic target 
detection and time synchronisation. Due to exist-
ing technical gaps in the case of RADAR, the MTE 
project realised initial investigations, how well astro-
nomical methods can be used for automatic target 
identification based on raw RADAR images. First tri-
als have shown that automatic target identification 
becomes possible and opens the door to separate 
between static and dynamic targets. Additionally it 
becomes possible to extract information of the tar-
get dimension for ongoing analysis. “
tion. Measured distances and bearing angles are 
analysed by RADAR to determine the position of 
targets relative to the own position. However, the 
RADAR based identification and tracking is compli-
cated by signal propagation effects as well as the 
absence of reliable methods to separate between 
traffic participants, obstacles and artefacts. Similar-
ly, the quality of AIS based target identification var-
ies in dependence on the capability and resilience 
of PNT and AIS equipment and communication. 
Initial investigations of the project MTE con-
firmed that neither the automatic acquisition of 
RADAR targets using ARPA (automatic RADAR plot-
ting aid) nor AIS alone are able to provide reliable 
and complete traffic pictures. In case of AIS it was 
shown that at the Baltic Sea 3% of AIS data includes 
default and 1% inconsistent values. Default values 
are defined in the AIS standard. Values are consid-
ered as critical, if increased deviations between 
successive positions and assigned speed and 
course indications are observed. Therefore it is also 
plausible that the sum of default and inconsistent 
AIS data increases up to 20% in harbour areas as a 
result of slowly moving and mooring vessels. 
 In the MTE project a method was developed 
to associate targets identified by AIS and RADAR 
(Heymann et al. 2013). It was found (Fig. 5), that in 
open water (in this case the Baltic Sea) nearly 90% 
of AIS targets can be associated with a RADAR tar-
get, whereas in harbour areas the association rate 
drops below 50%. The observed distance between 
associated AIS and RADAR targets is in the order of 
140 m up to 160 m for open sea and harbour ar-
eas and is compliant to the accuracy specifications 
of both systems (Fig. 5). The RADAR performance 
slightly decreases in harbour areas which can be 
explained with impaired RADAR signal propaga-
tion conditions. 
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Fig. 4: Error compensation by 
PNT Unit V1.0 (EKF: Extended 
Kalman Filter)
Fig. 5: Availability of targets 
identified by RADAR and mean 
distance between associated 
AIS and RADAR targets
